Opportunity rank #76 (cash-flow board) · South Korea

Korea's jeonse and foreign residential strategies, taken apart: the capital region's door is shut, and the deposit system's risk record sits in the national accounts

Our take: Below the bar
Return unverified Primary metric is a claimed figure · Unverified

Composite-board score: 2.9 · Where it is strong: Net cash flow, Tax friendliness · methodology

Data updated: 2026-11-08

This entry has no yield — not from laziness, but because two facts retire the yield question itself. The first is access: since 26 August 2025, a foreigner buying residential property anywhere in Seoul, in 23 Gyeonggi cities/counties or in 7 Incheon districts must obtain a Land Transaction Permission Certificate before signing (an unpermitted contract may be void), move in within about 4 months and reside in the property for at least 2 years — foreign buy-to-let in the capital region is effectively banned (the permit zones were renewed to 25 Aug 2027; an overlapping apartment layer covers all 25 Seoul districts to 31 Dec 2026; officetels are classified non-residential and sit outside). Outside the zones (Busan, Daegu, Jeju's main island and elsewhere) purchase remains free, with a report within 60 days of signing. The second fact is the risk shape of jeonse itself: the tenant posts a deposit worth a large fraction of the price, lives rent-free, and the landlord returns the whole deposit at term — the deposit-return liability sits entirely on the landlord, and 'gap investment' (letting a sitting tenant's deposit fund most of the purchase price) is that liability, levered. The risk record is national in scale: officially recognised jeonse-fraud victims reached 41,559 by September 2026 (nearly three in four under 40); HUG has paid out KRW 7.3866 trillion of deposits on behalf of just 2,559 habitual landlords, of which KRW 5.1241 trillion is unrecovered, and the government has put KRW 6.4 trillion into HUG over five years. The new rule from 13 November 2026 (the amended Jeonse Fraud Victims Support Act) floors a certified victim-tenant's recovery at one-third of the deposit — it protects tenants, after the fact; it does not make the landlord's position safe. Rated below-bar explainer: no door in the capital region, a deposit-liability landmine outside it — there is no route into Korean residential property that this site is willing to price for a foreign individual landlord.

In short: four lines first

What it costs to get in

(Explainer entry) No channel in the capital region; residential prices outside the zones are case by case

Roughly what it earns

没有可引用的数字:未找到外国个人房东的全成本净收益率序列(GPG 的韩国租金页不以文本形式给出数值)。本条只陈述两件可核实的制度事实:①首都圈外国人买房出租已于 2025-08-26 起被许可制实质关闭(签约前须取得土地交易许可、约 4 个月内入住、自住满 2 年);②전세 押金制度的风险记录——官方认定的 전세 诈骗受害者截至 2026 年 9 月达 41,559 人;HUG 已为仅 2,559 名惯犯房东垫付押金返还 ₩7.3866 万亿、其中 ₩5.1241 万亿未能追回。在「夹缝投资」(押金顶大半房价)结构里,这个返还负债的最终承担者就是房东本人。(Citable net yield for foreign jeonse/residential strategies in Korea)

How much work for you

Heavy burden (deposit liability and local management sit with the landlord)

The biggest catch

This entry is itself the risk statement (access): foreign buy-to-let in the capital region is effectively banned by the permit regime, and signing without permission risks a void contract — 'buy first, fix later' here is an invalid-transaction risk, not a paperwork backlog.

Figures we have not verified (shown for reference only, never used for conclusions):

Why we think it makes money

Access precedes yield in this site's country discipline: with the door shut, costing the yield in finer detail would be misdirection — this entry states the permit regime first (pre-contract, move-in, two years' self-residence) and the deposit system second; the order is the conclusion.

Jeonse's risk record deserves national-accounts precision: 41,559 recognised victims, KRW 7.3866 trillion paid out, KRW 5.1241 trillion unrecovered — when a system's bad debts are absorbed by a state guarantee corporation in the trillions, the meaning for a landlord is not 'beware bad tenants' but 'you are this chain's residual risk-bearer'.

With Canada (entry No. 63) and New Zealand (No. 55) it completes a triptych of developed-world closures to foreign residential buyers: Canada's ban-plus-heavy-tax, New Zealand's ban-plus-citizen-exemptions, Korea's permit-plus-self-residence — three legal shapes for shutting foreigners out of housing, visible in one pass.

How to actually get in

  1. This page offers no purchase route. The institutional facts are stated for self-verification: inside the capital-region permit zones, a foreign purchase requires pre-contract permission plus move-in/self-residence duties, with contract validity and penalties at stake for breach; outside the zones, purchase is free with a 60-day report. Nationality itself is not banned — the banned shape is the non-resident foreign landlord.

What it costs, what it earns

Entry amount: (Explainer entry) No channel in the capital region; residential prices outside the zones are case by case
How much work for you: Heavy burden (deposit liability and local management sit with the landlord)

Costs & taxes, item by item:

Basis: this site uses full-cost net returns only — income minus vacancy, management, maintenance, taxes and insurance, then financing interest, with entry costs in the denominator. See the methodology。

Identity & tax

Status (residency / citizenship)

旅游休闲设施投资移民(见身份枢纽)

This asset does not count toward the channel This asset leads to no status

Threshold: ₩10 亿起(指定地区旅游设施)

上市 REIT 股票不产生任何居留权益。韩国的地产类身份通道是独立的旅游休闲设施投资移民(2023 年由房地产投资移民更名):海外汇入自有资金 ≥₩10 亿投指定地区的旅游设施 → F-2-8 居留,维持 5 年 → F-5-17 永住;已在身份枢纽「花钱买身份」赛道单独评分。D-8 企业投资(≥₩1 亿 + ≥10% 表决权)是经营通道,与买房、买股无关。注意别混淆:₩15 亿是另一条公共利益投资移民(F-5-21)的门槛,不是本通道。

Source: Invest Korea(MOTIE);KBS World

Tax (investor level)

外国人购房税与国民同表(无单独「外国人税」):住宅取得税 1%(≤₩6 亿)滑动至 3%(>₩9 亿),加地方教育税(取得税的 10%)与农特税;调整区多套房附加 8%(第二套)/12%(第三套起),法人买住宅 12%。持有:地方财产税 0.1–0.4% + 综合房地产税(合计评税价超 ₩12 亿起征,门槛屡变、以建页时为准)。资本利得:6–45% 累进 + 地方所得税为国税的 10%(实际边际 6.6–49.5%),年基本扣除 ₩250 万。

  • 首都圈另有许可制(见主指标):那是准入问题,先于一切税率。

Double-tax treaties: 不动产所得与利得在来源国征税,星韩协定不改变上述框架。

Source: 韩国地方税法/所得税法一般框架(经执业指南汇编)

This section is general information only — not immigration or tax advice. Program rules change frequently; before acting, rely on the official texts and a licensed adviser.

Risks: what could go wrong

This entry is itself the risk statement (access): foreign buy-to-let in the capital region is effectively banned by the permit regime, and signing without permission risks a void contract — 'buy first, fix later' here is an invalid-transaction risk, not a paperwork backlog. If these happen, our take changes: If the permit regime lapses unrenewed or its scope materially shrinks (MOLIT notice basis), this entry's access conclusion is revised.
This entry is itself the risk statement (the system): jeonse deposit-return liability concentrates on the landlord, and gap structures blow up first when prices fall — HUG's trillion-won payout record is that risk's realised history, independent of any individual landlord's character. If these happen, our take changes: None (institutional property).
The structural migration to monthly rent (wolse): monthly-rent share of new contracts is rising and Seoul's new-contract monthly rents are up sharply — jeonse supply is shrinking, so any costing built on the old system's deposit availability overstates it. If these happen, our take changes: Checked annually against MOLIT lease statistics on the jeonse/wolse mix.

What we have not verified yet

The following key figures have not yet been verified; the reason is noted for each item.

FAQ

Surely I can buy in Busan and let it?
Legally yes (free purchase outside the zones, 60-day report) — but this site will not price that route: first, no citable net-yield series exists for foreign individual landlords; second, under a jeonse letting, the deposit-return liability's institutional risk is identical to Seoul's; third, exit liquidity and management radius outside the capital region are real costs for a non-resident foreigner. Lawful is not the same as recommendable — this site leaves the cell empty until citable data exists.
Jeonse fraud harms tenants — what has it to do with landlords?
In the fraud cases the victims are tenants; but the system's ordinary risk is borne by landlords: the deposit is repayable in full at term as the landlord's hard liability, and when prices fall the 'sale proceeds no longer cover the deposit' gap comes out of the landlord's own pocket — HUG's recourse claims after paying out are against landlords, and KRW 5.1241 trillion unrecovered means large numbers of landlords are already insolvent. Foreign gap-investment marketing talks about 'getting in with less of your own money'; it does not mention that the end of that liability chain is you.
Officetels sit outside the permit regime — is that the foreigner's crack?
In classification terms it is non-residential and outside the permit regime — the legal crack is real. This site does not write it up as a route: officetel rent bases, VAT and residential-tax differences, and its realised returns in the Korean leasing market likewise have no citable net series for foreign individuals. A crack existing is not an opportunity standing — the cell stays empty, as with Busan, pending data.

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Data dates are marked per metric; page updated 2026-11-08. This site publishes information and is not investment advice; the corrections channel is in the Disclaimer。